Big ideas: innovation policy by Van Reenen, John
CentrePiece Autumn 2011
In the last CentrePiece, John Van Reenen
stressed the importance of competition and
labour market flexibility for productivity growth.
His latest in CEP’s ‘big ideas’ series describes
the impact of research on how policy-makers
can influence innovation more directly –







n the wake of the Great
Recession, the UK is hardly
alone in looking for sources of
economic growth. Economists
and many other commentators
agree that technological
innovation must be at the heart of long-
run growth. It is also widely understood
that left to itself the market is unlikely to
provide enough incentives for innovation.
This ‘market failure’ is primarily
because only a small proportion of the
benefits of invention are captured by the
firm or individual who spends money and
time on research. Most of the benefits of
invention ‘spill over’ to other firms who
can copy the new idea without having to
pay the upfront research costs. For
example, it took a lot of effort to invent
the automobile and the personal
computer – but once they were invented,
imitators crowded in.
This means that there will be too little
spent on research and development
(R&D) from the point of view of society
as a whole. Intellectual property rights,
such as patents and copyright, were
designed to protect inventors and
increase their incentive to innovate. But
in most cases patents can be designed
around so they do not fully eliminate the
market failure.
So can there be a role for public
policy in stimulating innovation? Is it
driven by fundamental factors, such as
culture and luck, which are beyond the
ability of governments to influence
except in the most minor ways? 
CEP research has challenged the fatalistic
attitude that innovation is not amenable
to government action. One direct way to
influence innovation is through the tax
system, in particular by offering a tax
break for business spending on R&D.
I started working on fiscal incentives
for R&D in the mid-1990s after being
shocked to discover that the share of UK
national income spent on business R&D
had declined since the late 1970s. In just
about every other developed country, it
had been rising.
The United States introduced an R&D
tax credit in 1981 under Ronald Reagan,
but the UK Treasury had always resisted
the idea, arguing that firms were unlikely
to increase their R&D efforts significantly
in response. Evaluations of the US system
seemed to show, however, that after a
few teething problems, American firms
had responded to these tax incentives.
Working with Bronwyn Hall of the
University of California at Berkeley, our
review of all the existing evidence
showed that when researchers used good
quality firm-level data and tracked
companies over time, they found that tax
credits stimulated significant American
R&D spending (Hall and Van Reenen,
2000). Were UK firms likely to be so
much more lethargic than their
counterparts across the Atlantic?
At that time, international evidence
on the effectiveness of innovation tax
policy was almost non-existent. No one
had even collected systematic information
on the tax benefits to R&D across
countries over time – not the
International Monetary Fund, the OECD,
the World Bank or the United Nations.
Together with Rachel Griffith (now
deputy research director of the Institute
for Fiscal Studies), we put together a
team and embarked on a major effort to
measure the impact of the tax system on
the costs of R&D capital across all the
major economies over 20 years. A
downside of this was that we had to
wade through many dusty tomes of
rather tedious tax and accounting rules.
Once we had accomplished that
arduous task, we were able to show that
there had been a major shift towards
R&D tax credits and away from direct
subsidies. One of the advantages of tax
credits over the more traditional grants
was that the government could simply
set the rules and it did not have to get
involved with ‘picking winners’.
More importantly perhaps, we
combined the tax data with information
on national R&D and showed that tax
credits had a large effect on increasing
business R&D. Although a 10% reduction
in the tax costs only increased private
sector R&D spending by about 1% in the
first year after an R&D tax credit was
introduced, in the long run R&D volumes
rose by a full 10% (Bloom et al, 2002).
So far, so good. But what we care
about is not R&D per se, as this is just an
input. We care about economic growth,
which will increase wages and
consumption. To tackle this problem, 
we had to develop a new model of
s
A strong R&D base 
helps a country to imitate
as well as innovate
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‘endogenous growth’ that took account
of not just the obvious effect of R&D on
innovation but also the less obvious
‘second face’ of R&D, which fosters
diffusion of existing innovations.
Having more scientists helps the UK
catch up with leading-edge countries
because they can read and understand
new ideas, which can then be ‘absorbed’
more effectively in the UK economy. For a
country like the UK, which is sadly often
far from the technological frontier, this is
very important. It means that just sitting
back and letting other countries – the
United States, Germany, Japan and
increasingly China – do all the innovation
is unlikely to be the right strategy.
A strong R&D base helps a country 
to imitate as well as innovate. In a 
speech on the science budget last year,
David Willetts, the universities and
science minister, quoted CEP’s research 
in this area:
‘Some 95% of scientific research is
conducted outside the UK. We need to be
able to apply it here – and, in advanced
scientific fields, it is often necessary to
conduct leading-edge research in order to
understand, assimilate and exploit the
leading-edge research of others.
‘It is this absorptive capacity which is
crucial. Indeed, Griffiths, Redding and Van
Reenen have shown that higher domestic
business R&D spend also leads to greater
productivity being generated at home
from foreign R&D spend as well. And
there are powerful feedback mechanisms
on top of this – foreign companies cite the
quality of the public research base as one
of the main reasons for locating their own
internationally mobile R&D here.’
In a series of studies with Princeton
University’s Steve Redding (who was
director of CEP’s globalisation programme
from 2005 to 2010), we created an
econometric model for the whole OECD,
which showed how R&D stimulated
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productivity growth through both
innovation and imitation (Griffith et al,
2004). We combined this with our R&D
tax information to simulate the effects of
introducing an R&D tax credit in the UK.
We found that the benefits of an
R&D tax credit would easily outweigh the
costs, which implied that it could be a
successful policy (Griffith et al, 1999).
But we also cautioned that, as ever, the
devil was in the detail: making the tax
complicated could unwind its effects.
Our work appeared in academic
journals, policy pamphlets and the
printed and broadcast media. It was also
picked up by Dan Corry (who was to
become head of the No. 10 policy unit
during Gordon Brown’s term of office as
prime minister) when he was at the
Institute for Public Policy Research. The
proposals became part of Labour’s 1997
manifesto, which ushered in the first
ever R&D tax credit in the UK in 2001 –
initially just for small and medium-sized
enterprises, but later extended to firms
of all sizes.
In an illustration of the close
connection between academic ideas and
policy-making, our co-author on the tax
credit work was Nick Bloom, who was
then my PhD student. After graduating,
he was seconded to the Treasury to help
them introduce the tax credit and its
extension to large firms (in 2003). 
Nick led CEP’s research programme on
productivity between 2003 and 2006
and pushed forward the Centre’s
continuing investigations of the ways in
which policy can be used to stimulate
innovation. 
The R&D tax credit is under review by
the current government, but it looks like
it will remain a permanent fixture of the
fiscal scene. The UK’s R&D intensity
stopped declining in the mid-2000s,
which coincides with the bedding down
















coincidence and more rigorous
evaluations of the effects of the fiscal
incentives are needed. Nevertheless, 
the initial findings are encouraging and
our work in progress suggests that US
R&D tax credits raise firms’ market
values, productivity and innovation
(Bloom et al, 2010).
The R&D tax credit story is a useful
parable of the interaction of
fundamental economic research with
policy development and implementation.
It contrasts with the ‘patent box’, a
poorly targeted policy that consists of tax
benefits to the royalties on patents: such
rewards create few ‘spillovers’ as the
research is already done. The patent box
policy was proposed in the dying days of
the Labour government and it will waste
around £1 billion a year at a time when
the country can ill afford it. While this
looks like being another of the few
Labour policies that the government is
continuing, in this case the continuity 
is unfortunate. 
John Van Reenen is director of CEP.
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